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on 05-03-2009 00:00
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Hanta Yuda AR, political analyst and researcher at the Indonesian Institute, Jakarta.
The Jakarta Post, March 5, 2009
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It is predicted the Golkar Party will have difficulty meeting the target to garner 30 percent of the votes in the 2009 elections, at least according to several poll results.
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In December 2008 the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) indicated that support for the Golkar Party had dramatically decreased to 13.3 percent, while support for the Democratic Party (PD) experienced a significant jump, to 23 percent. The position of Golkar is still below that of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), who has 17.7 percent.
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Golkar’s electoral strength is showing a decreasing trend. In the 1997 election, the last election of the New Order era, Golkar won an absolute victory, with 74.1 percent of the vote. In the 1999 election, Golkar’s vote dropped dramatically to 22.3 percent of the vote.
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Golkar’s percentage decreased yet again in the 2004 legislative elections, with only 21.5 percent of vote, while the PDI-P garnered 18.5 percent and Democratic Party (PD) 7.4 percent. As indicated by the LSI’s survey results of 13.3 percent, Golkar has fallen into a danger zone; it could go from having the status of a major political party to being just a medium-sized contender. (It is important to note however, that the LSI is also working for a major political party.)
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One interesting phenomenon is that as the support for Golkar decreases, the support for the Democrat Party is likely to rise significantly. Both parties are in fact governing parties. The Golkar Party is led by the Vice President, which suggests that the Democratic Party is more appealing than the Golkar Party. Why has this happened?
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If the government is considered successful, the popularity and the reelection chances of President Yudhoyono will increase, and this will have a positive impact on the perception of the Democratic Party: Its popularity will also increase.
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Meanwhile, Golkar will not necessarily get maximum sympathy from the people, perhaps because of the strategic position of Yudhoyono, which is considered greater than that of Jusuf Kalla and the Golkar Party.
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However, if the government is considered to have failed, the Golkar Party will still be directly affected. This is because the public cannot simply set aside the reality that Jusuf Kalla is the Vice President and his party supports the government: This could cause trouble for Golkar. Public support for the Golkar Party is not only influenced by external factors like the government’s popularity, but is also influenced by internal factors. There are two potential threats from inside the Golkar Party.
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First, the potential fractionalization among the elite. The fractionalization could undermine the solidity of the party, making it susceptible to internal conflicts, which would be counterproductive for Golkar in the 2009 election.
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Second, the pattern of undemocratic practices and aspirations. The Golkar Party still selects its leaders, especially the candidates for regional heads, on the basis of their economic contributions. On the other hand, the intervention of party officials from the central board (DPP) is still strong. The selection process of regional leaders does not apply transparent democratic principles; it still depends heavily on the desires of the party elite rather than those of the constituents.
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There are two possible scenarios for the Golkar Party in the upcoming elections.
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First, a fall in the number of votes in the legislative elections would have an impact on Jusuf Kalla’s leadership of the Golkar Party. Kalla would be perceived as the one most responsible for the defeat of Golkar. If this happens, the political bargaining power of Golkar in the presidential election race would decrease. Jusuf Kalla could benefit from this, as he could still run as a vice presidential candidate.
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Second, if the number of votes exceed that of the 2004 elections or reach 30 percent, the party would nominate its own presidential candidate, it could not simply nominate a vice presidential candidate, as this would undermine its political prestige.
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By strengthening the demand for Golkar to nominate its own prominent figure as a presidential candidate and not just a vice presidential candidate, this victory would create a dilemma for Jusuf Kalla. The popularity and electability of Jusuf Kalla are still in doubt; he may not be strong enough to compete with the other candidates.
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Golkar’s political strategy to overcome the political competition will be severely tested. The Golkar Party, which is ideologically a center party, has two strong competitors: The PDI-P and the Democrat Party.
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It is unlikely Golkar can obtain 30 percent of the vote. It seems more plausible that it will maintain the same number of votes as in 2004. In addition, Golkar’s electoral strength will also depend on the perception of voters, which is closely related to their strategy and the innovation of the image projection of the party. Without political innovation, the voters will have difficulty distinguishing the Golkar Party from other political parties.
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The writer is a political analyst and researcher at the Indonesian Institute, Jakarta.
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